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TRENDS AND ISSUES FOR
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Martin Novak
National Institute of Justice
martin.novak@usdoj.gov

1.

INTRODUCTION

Though the use of computer forensics in criminal investigations has expanded in recent
years, there is little empirical evidence about
the prevalence of the use of digital evidence
in the court system and its impact on prosecutorial outcomes. [1]
The terms digital evidence and computer
forensics are closely related, yet there are
differences. Computer forensics is the uncovering and examination of evidence located
on all electronic devices with digital storage, including computers, cell phones, and
net-works. Though there is no universally accepted standard for computer forensics, there
are generally accepted practices in place. [2]
In 2014, the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) published its Best
Practices for Computer Forensics to describe
the best practices for collecting, acquiring,
analyzing, and documenting the data found
in computer forensic examinations. Similar
to other published best practices, it is not a
step-by-step guide nor legal advice, and only
addresses the types of technologies available
at the time of publication.
c 2020 JDFSL

While computer forensics involves all digital storage, digital evidence is information
stored or transmitted in binary form that
may be relied on in court. There are countless potential sources of digital evidence, including text messages, images downloaded
to a computer, a mobile device’s call log,
network access logs, chat sessions, internet
browser history and cache files, passwords,
documents, spreadsheets, and databases.
This paper is an examination of federal
criminal cases before the United States Court
of Appeal in which legal issues were related
to digital evidence. The purpose of this research was to determine the most common
legal basis for appeals relating to the introduction or exclusion of digital evidence, the
frequency with which cases involving an appeal regarding digital evidence affirmed or
reversed for the defense, whether certain challenges to digital evidence are more prevalent
than others, and whether there are trends
or areas of the law as applied to computer
forensics and digital evidence needing further
attention by the criminal justice system.
The digital evidence produced by computer forensics has the potential to identify
suspects, win acquittal, or obtain a convicPage 1
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tion. Information obtained through digital
evidence can be used to both corroborate and
establish necessary elements of prosecution
and defense cases such as motive, suspect or
witness location, and alibis. Two high-profile
cases anecdotally illustrate both the value of
introducing digital evidence, as well as the
limited value of that evidence in the absence
of clarity and credibility of the forensic methods used to obtain it.

1.1

Cobb County, Georgia

On September 14, 2014, Ross Harris was
charged with two counts of felony murder
in the death of his son, Cooper Harris. The
Cobb County, Georgia charging documents
stated that Harris maliciously caused the
death of his son by leaving him alone in a
hot motor vehicle with the windows shut on
June 18, 2014. [3] He was also charged with
Criminal Cruelty to a Child and Criminal
Attempt to Commit a Felony.
Investigators were at first puzzled as to
why a seemingly loving father would murder
his child. A forensic examination of a computer, mobile device, thumb drive, external
hard drive, SD card, and DVD – all belonging to Harris – led police to discover the
motive for the murder. Text messages recovered from the computer showed that Harris
was having an affair with a 17-year-old high
school student. Online searches recovered
from his computer demonstrated that Harris
was searching for information on the age of
consent in the State of Georgia and “how to
survive in prison.” Examination of his mobile
device also recovered evidence that Harris
had been “sexting” with several other women
while his son was dying in the overheated car.
On November 14, 2016, Harris was convicted
of murder in the first degree of his son and
sentenced to life without parole.
According to the American Bar Association, digital evidence “can have a long-lasting
effect on the court or jurors, regardless of the
Page 2
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reason for being admitted into evidence and
notwithstanding any related jury instructions
as to the limitations of that evidence.” [4]
The kind of effect may depend on the quality
of the evidence presented. Matt McCusker,
of the American Society of Trial Lawyers,
warns that “the average juror does not have
the expertise to differentiate between ’good
science’ and ’junk science,’ so the court must
help them by excluding dubious evidence.” [5]
The murder trial of Casey Anthony, outlined
below, is a case in point.

1.2

Orange County, Florida

On October 14, 2008, Casey Anthony was
indicted by an Orange County, Florida grand
jury with Capital Murder in the First Degree
in the death of her daughter, Caylee Anthony.
Prosecutors alleged that Anthony used chloroform on Caylee, then suffocated her by
covering the girl’s mouth and nose with duct
tape. They also alleged that Anthony put
her daughter’s body in her car trunk before
disposing of it. The child’s skeletal remains
were found in December 2008, less than a
mile from the home of Anthony’s parents.
A computer forensics examiner testified
for the prosecution, stating that someone
had searched the words “chloroform” a total
of 84 times on a computer seized from the
Anthony home. [6] The examiner further
testified that the searches were found in a
portion of the hard drive believed to have
held deleted files. The implication was that
Anthony had made those searches and was
evidence of premeditation.
During his forensic examination of the computer, the examiner used two tools to perform the keyword searches that found the
word “chloroform.” While it is generally good
forensic practice to duplicate one’s searches
with multiple tools, in this case, it caused confusion for the jury. The timestamps, which
indicate when a particular search was made,
did not synch between the two tools used.
c 2020 JDFSL
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This could have easily been explained in that
the tools used different methods to conduct
their respective searches, but the prosecution
gave no such explanation.
The counsel for the defense saw a weakness
in the prosecution’s case and swiftly brought
it to the jury’s attention. Jose Baez, lead
counsel for the defense, stated, “The state’s
computer forensic evidence involving chloroform research, a central element of their
premeditation argument, was used to mislead
the jury and that the flaws in that evidence
infected their entire case like a cancer.” [7]
Anthony was found not guilty on the
charge of capital murder in the first degree on
July 5, 2011. The jury based its decision, in
part, on the lack of credible forensic evidence
linking her to the alleged crime.
These two cases clearly illustrate the power
that digital evidence can have in the disposition of a case, and raise questions about the
legal precedent regarding digital evidence and
its impact on prosecutorial outcomes. The
next section discusses relevant literature that
has helped inform the debate about computer
forensics and digital evidence.

2.

LITERATURE
REVIEW

Although the literature on computer forensics
is somewhat limited, particularly in regard to
courts, there is research that discusses issues
relevant to computer forensics and digital evidence in courts. This literature can be largely
be broken into the three areas of Search and
Seizure, Admissibility, and Precedent. Together, the literature under each topic forms
a foundation of research on which the research questions of this study were built. In
this literature review, each body of literature
is discussed.
c 2020 JDFSL
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2.1

Search and Seizure

Search and seizure allows law enforcement to
search and seize property after obtaining a
warrant based on probable cause. In considering the prevalence and impact of computer
forensics in the court system, it is important
to consider digital evidence regarding search
and seizure practices. Because it is inherently different from physical evidence, digital
evidence presents a unique set of search and
seizure complications.
As Garfinkel states in Digital Forensics,
electronic storage devices can serve as two
different kinds of digital evidence, each with
its own set of complications. [8] In the first
case, an electronic storage device might contain evidence of a crime that took place in
the physical world, such as murder, rape, or
child molestation. In these cases, the device
is incidental to the crimeit is a vessel that
helped facilitate a crime, but not an object
directly involved in the physical criminal act.
In this case, investigators face the difficulty
that, as Garfinkel states, “Computerization
has made the evidence harder for investigators to analyze than paper records.” [9]
The second scenario in which an electronic
storage device serves as a form of digital evidence is where it is inherently part of the
crime committed. An example of this is hacking or possession of child pornography. In
these cases, Garfinkel says, “investigators are
often hampered by the technical sophistication of the systems and the massive amount
of evidence to analyze.” [10]
In both cases, the presence of digital evidence raises important questions about how
search and seizure practices should be applied. This review examines the literature
around these debates, particularly with regard to Warrants and Plain View.
Page 3
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2.1.1

Search and Seizure: Warrants

A warrant provides police with the legal authority to conduct a search of physical property. However, the concept of warrants was
developed in and for a context of physical
evidence, and its application to digital evidence is complicated. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search,
but there is debate among scholars with regard to whether and how the rules for searching for digital evidence should be adapted so
as not to violate this protection. This debate
is outlined below.
The scholars Kerr (2005), Rummel (2011),
and Bartholomew (2014) argue that the
search for digital evidence is not a one-step
process, as with physical evidence, but rather
a two-step process. Kerr explains that “the
police first execute a physical search to seize
computer hardware, and then later execute
a second electronic search to obtain the data
from the seized computer storage device.” [11]
Similarly, Ohm (2011) believes that a second warrant should be required in order to
meet the particularity requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. Ohm states that this
warrant should “clearly approv[e] the search
of a particular computer’s hard disk or storage media, which is already secured and
seized by the government pursuant to an earlier probable cause search (ideally a first warrant) . . . [ensuring that] when a magistrate
approves that search, he or she is aware of
what is being authorized.” [12]
Other scholars have historically disagreed
with this two-step view. Some have argued
that computer searches should be viewed by
the courts in the same manner as the physical
search of documents and other containers of
information, such as a filing cabinet. Clancy
(2005) explains that “a computer is a container of containers of documents, that is,
each individual file is a separate container —
just like each manila file in a filing cabinet is
Page 4

Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...

a container — that requires a separate opening to determine what is inside.” [13] Clancy
states that accepting this view does not imply
accepting that a particularized warrant will
become a general warrant. Instead, the rules
that are in place that limit the scope of the
search itself, such as the nature of the crime
or the evidence one expects to find, will allow
the court to determine the sufficiency of the
information provided to them in the warrant
that authorized the search.
In 2015, the Supreme Court offered clarity
with regard to the warrant requirement to
search digital content. In Riley v. California
decision [14], the Supreme Court declared
that the “answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone
seized incident to an arrest is . . . simple
— get a warrant.” [15] [16] This landmark
ruling closed a debate regarding whether law
enforcement needed to obtain a warrant before searching for digital evidence.
Although the Supreme Court declaration
established the need for a warrant, questions remained regarding the details of warrants used to collect digital data. Gershowitz
(2015) suggests two approaches for searches
involving cell phones. First, he says that
“judges should impose search protocols that
specify in advance exactly how police should
execute warrants and sift through electronic
data.” [17] In a second method, Gershowitz
suggests that “magistrates should initially restrict warrants to a manual search of the
particular functions or applications for which
there is probable cause.” [18] He predicts that
the use of these restrictions will protect the
privacy rights of individuals, prevent the use
of the “good faith” exception, [19] and allow
law enforcement to conduct searches of cell
phones when there is probable cause to do
so.
Similarly to Gershowitz, Huynh (2015) suggests a process-based protocol for the search
of cell phones in which forensic examiners
c 2020 JDFSL
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must describe the following in warrant applications: a technical explanation of the search
procedure, an explanation of what is being
sought, the extent of the process being used,
description of the process used to copy the
device for analysis, methods used to isolate
information that is outside of the scope of
the warrant, plans for purging nonresponsive
data, and detail of the access control policies
in place by the examining agency. [20] Huynh
contends that the protocol would enhance the
particularity within a search, and limit the
number of successful defense challenges at
trial.
An additional complication in the application of search and seizure principles to digital evidence relates to the problem of nonresponsive digital data. In Commentary on
the Ganias Case, Kerr (2015) discusses a way
to avoid the problem of over-seizure and the
disposition of non-responsive data. In the
case of paper records that have been seized,
once the non-responsive records have been
filtered, they can easily be returned. This
is not the case with records that exist on
digital media because “[w]e cannot cut off
a piece of the physical hard drive. Even if
we could, data is not stored contiguously on
the medium.” [21] It is simply not possible
to return non-responsive data in a computer
search. This leads to the concern that law
enforcement will use initially non-responsive
data as grounds for future searches unrelated
to the initial search warrant. Kerr’s solution
is to forbid law enforcement from obtaining a
second warrant based on non-responsive data
found in the first warrant. To use the nonresponsive data, Kerr says, “The exclusionary rule would not apply if the government
searched the seized computer under a second
warrant when it could prove by a preponderance that the evidence sought in the second
warrant would have been obtained elsewhere.”
[22]
c 2020 JDFSL
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2.1.2

Search and Seizure: Plain
View

Closely related to the issues of warrants in
collecting and searching digital data is the
issue of the Plain View Doctrine. In a context
of physical evidence, plain view allows a law
enforcement officer to search items found in
plain sight without a warrant. However, the
definition of plain view is complicated in the
context of digital evidence.
Because inculpatory evidence can be hidden, obfuscated, or encrypted, law enforcement regularly receives authorizations to
seize large amounts of data. This leads to concerns of over-seizure, and complicates the definition of plain view once data is in the hands
of law enforcement. Angeli et al. (2005) state
that the “seizure and search of electronic data
presents unique challenges and illustrates the
tension between the legitimate law enforcement need to search for and seize evidence,
on the one hand, and the Fourth Amendment
privacy interests of individuals and other entities, on the other.” [23]
The literature presents several views on
the debate of how the concept of plain view
should apply to digital evidence. Some scholars believe that plain view in the traditional
sense should apply to computer searches. [24]
Mantei (2011) states that the “scope of plain
view seizure, like the search itself, is dictated
by the factual circumstances of an investigation.” He also advises that law enforcement
should seek a second warrant when evidence
is discovered that is not part of the original
warrant. Hood (2011) says that “the inadvertent discovery requirement in the context
of plain view seizures of electronically stored
evidence offers the most viable method for
ensuring that government seizures of electronically stored evidence do not become general
or exploratory and comply with the explicit
commands of the Fourth Amendment.” [25]
Page 5
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Another line of thought among scholars is
that the forensic examination of computers
should be excluded from the plain view doctrine. Their reasoning is that some potential
evidence on a computer may not be discoverable without the use of specialized tools,
such as the contents of a computer’s memory, metadata, the internet cache, deleted
files, password protected files, file fragments,
and files in unallocated space. This evidence
will never be in plain view. For these reasons, Daniel (2009) concludes that a “targeted
forensic examination should be completely excluded from the plain view doctrine as it is
an intrusive search and allows the examiner
to see everything on the computer, regardless
of its location or origin.” [26]
A third opinion, expressed by Weinstein
and Drake (2014), is that the federal wiretap stat-utes could be applied to computer
searches, thereby protecting the privacy of
individuals and the investigative needs of law
enforcement. Wiretap orders function much
like search warrants, except they allow for the
collection of information as it occurs in real
time (such as phone conversations). There
are a series of procedures that the government
must follow if wiretapping. These procedures
are designed to minimize privacy challenges,
and require the government to minimize the
interception of non-criminal conversations,
report information seized to the judge within
14 days of authorization, and be subject to
ongoing monitoring by the presiding judge.
Applying these wiretap protocols to computer
searches would be a “model for consistent
procedures and judicial oversight.” [27] Employing these protocols could even provide
an incentive for law enforcement to conduct
searches more efficiently, knowing that the
protocols for reporting are in place.

2.2

Admissibility

The second body of literature relevant to
questions of digital evidence and courts disPage 6

cusses the issue of admissibility. To be considered in court, evidence — physical or digital — must pass the test of admissibility,
which includes consideration of whether the
evidence is relevant, reliable, and not unfairly prejudicial. Givens (2004) points to
major differences between electronic and paper evidence that should be addressed when
consid-ering admissibility, using email for his
examples. The first difference is obtainability. Givens points out that “without email,
many conversations simply would not exist.”
[28] The second difference is one of availability. Email often passes through and is stored
by third-party systems, such that “a simple
search of the third party system could turn
up several ‘deleted’ or otherwise misplaced
files.” [29] Finally, there is a difference in
the content of an email versus a paper document. Email contains information not found
in pa-per documents, such as file header information, distribution lists, and receipts of acknowledgment. With this knowledge, Givens
says, those offering email as evidence “should
at least be required to present witness testimony to show the reliability of the computer
system used to store or create the electronic
data being offered.” [30]
In Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance
Company, 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. May 4,
2007), [31] Magistrate Judge Paul D. Grimm
(United States District Court for the District
of Maryland) provided the field with guidance
on the admissibility of electronic evidence. In
the ensuing years, the case drew comments
and criticism from legal scholars. According
to the court, when Electronically Stored Information (ESI) is offered as evidence, the
following evidentiary rules must be considered: relevancy, authenticity, hearsay, best
evidence, and probative value. [32]
Levy-Sachs and Archambault (2008) stated
that “[D]espite the fact that the Court provides a general roadmap for admissibility of
ESI, the Court does not indicate whether
c 2020 JDFSL
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more stringent standards are necessary or desirable.” [33] Frieden and Murray (2011) believe that the methods for authentication proscribed in Lorraine v. Markel are similar to
those of traditional evidence. They state that
though “certain issues, such as authentication,
may be more complicated in the context of
electronic evidence, traditional evidentiary
principles can be consistently adapted to address questions regarding the admissibility of
electronic evidence.” [34]
In an article written for the American Bar
Association, Grimm, the presiding judge in
the Markel case, recognizes that some courts
subject electronic evidence “..to far greater
levels of scrutiny than applied to non-digital
evidence when deciding whether to admit it.”
[35] He provides advice for those who consider submitting digital evidence at trial: “If
you identify the digital evidence you want to
use prior to trial, learn as much as possible
about how it works (using the Internet can
be an inexpensive and helpful way to do so),
carefully select which authentication method
you want to use, and (if it involves using
an expert or subpoenaing records) make arrangements sufficiently far in advance to be
prepared at trial, you will greatly enhance
your chances of success.” [36]

2.3

The Daubert Standard

The Daubert Standard requires that the five
factors of testing, peer review, error rate,
standards, and acceptability be applied to
scientific evidence. The Daubert Standard
was promulgated in the landmark Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 579 U.S. 92
(June 28, 1993), which establishes the aforementioned standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in federal court. This ruling
was further expanded in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 119 U.S. 1167 (Mar. 23, 1999)
[37], which established that the Daubert standard must be applied to expert testimony
from non-scientists.
c 2020 JDFSL
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Legal scholars have since weighed in on
the Daubert Standard as it applies to digital
evidence as well as the expert witnesses that
testify on that evidence. Meyers and Rogers
(2004) wrote of the need for standards and
certification in the field of computer forensics.
One area of concern noted was the inability
to know the exact functionality of the tools
used in computer forensics. Their observation
that the “majority of the tools and software
used in computer forensics is proprietary and
copyrighted, thus negating the ability to access the source code” [38] is still valid today.
They also noted a lack of known error rates
for these same tools. They conclude that,
much like a certified professional accountant,
the field of computer forensics needs methods that “ensure that the practice is credible
and reliable and that the individuals claiming
to be professionals have met a certain certification criterion.” [39] In their conclusion,
Meyers and Rogers warn that the “continued
lack of a professional certification, investigative standards, and peer-reviewed method,
may ultimately result in computer forensics
being relegated to a “junk science,” as opposed to a recognized scientific discipline.”
[40]
Atkinson similarly argues for the need to
validate data. According to him, the means
to produce digital evidence are software programs, for which formal proofs are virtually
nonexistent. These programs are themselves
a sequence of binary digits and are subject
to frequent changes in their code. This leads
to Atkinson to ask: “At what point should a
mess of ones and zeroes be trusted either as
evidence, or to provide it?” [41] To address
these concerns, Atkinson contends that software engineers should promote transparency
in the “inner workings” of the tools that produce digital evidence, providing more opportunities for validation of tools, and provide
the tools more credibility in court.
Page 7
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Garfinkel (2010) also grappled with the
lack of known error rates in the field of computer forensics, noting that the “research community should work to develop digital forensic techniques that produce reportable rates
for error or certainty when they are run.” [42]
Garfinkel also notes the benefit to tool developers and those evaluating tools for use in
having a standardized set of digital corpora.
This would enable developers to test their
tools with larger data sets and allow others
to replicate their results more easily.
The Daubert Standard also applies to testimony of expert witnesses, Garrie and Morrissy (2014) suggest that a well-written computer forensic report could circumvent the
need for an expert’s testimony altogether. According to the authors, the adequately written report should sufficiently detail the methods used, document the assumptions made
by the computer forensic examiner, the tools
used to complete the forensic exam, eliminate any superfluous information, and be
objective in its tone. Finally, the findings in
the report “should be qualified in regard to
the capabilities of the [computer forensics]
tool used in the exam, and the scope of the
investigation.” [43]

2.4

Precedent

The American legal system relies heavily on
the doctrine of stare decisis, which means
to stand by things decided. In an examination of Supreme Court cases from 1946
through 1995, Spriggs and Hansford (2001)
found that “a precedent is more likely to be
overruled when it is ideologically incongruent
with the preferences of a subsequent Court.”
[44] In other words, conservative precedents
are more likely to be overruled by liberal
courts.
Benesh and Riddick (2002) examined precedent and circuit characteristics to determine
whether a circuit court was likely to follow
Supreme Court precedence. The factors in
Page 8

their analysis included the unanimity of the
precedent ruling, the complexity of the matter ruled upon, and the age of the precedent
being overruled. Their results showed that
the circuit courts complied with the overruling of older precedents more quickly than
more recent precedents. However, those same
circuit courts “were more reluctant to comply
with new criminal procedure precedents than
they were precedents in other areas.” [45]
Kassow, et al. (2012) examined the
responsiveness of state supreme courts to
precedents set by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Their methodology included scrutinizing the
treatment of those precedents in the state
court’s opinions to test the value of precedent
strength versus the influence of the ideological preferences of the state courts. [46] They
found that the “more the U.S. Supreme Court
reinforced its original precedent with subsequent decisions indicating continued support
for the precedent, the more likely state courts
were to provide a positive treatment of the
precedent.” [47]
Re (2016) found that the lower courts may
apply more narrow readings of the federal
court’s precedent. He called this action “narrowing from below.” There are several reasons
lower courts may narrow from below, including “to update obsolete precedents, mitigate
the harmful consequences of the Court’s errors, and enhance the transparency of their
decision-making process.” [48] He cites the
following legitimacy conditions that lower
courts consider when narrowing from above:
whether the precedent applies, whether it is
correct, and whether it implicates other legal principles. Re concludes that “narrowing
from below is usually legitimate when lower
courts adopt reasonable readings of higher
court precedent, even though those readings
are not the most persuasive ones available.”
[49]
Alan Butler discusses how the precedent
set in Riley v. California, (134 S. Ct. 2473.
c 2020 JDFSL
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2014), may affect how lower courts rule on
the issue of how long law enforcement may
collect, search, and store digital data. Butler
begins by pointing out that Riley precedent
“supports the conclusion that the retention
of electronic data should be subject to different Fourth Amendment rules than those used
for handling physical evidence, [and that] Riley would also support a narrower construction of the ‘plain view’ exception for digital
searches.” [50] He then demonstrates how the
Riley precedent may be interpreted by the
lower courts.
In United States v. Ganias, (F. App. 9706
2nd Cir. 2016), Butler finds that the Second Circuit’s ruling that “the government’s
‘seizure and retention’ of digital files beyond
the scope of their 2003 warrant was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” [51]
was consistent with the privacy interests expressed in Riley, and that other courts would
likely follow precedent in this regard.
In United States v. Miller (34 F. Supp.
3d 695), Butler found that the Third Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that a
forensic search of his digital camera violated
his rights under the Fourth Amendment. In
this in-stance, the court took a narrower view
of Riley, saying that “the search of a digital camera is different than the search of a
smartphone because cameras only ‘contain a
limited type of data, restricted to image and
video files that do not touch the breadth or
analysis" from a warrantless search incident
to arrest.’ [52]
Finally, Atkinson (2014) asserts that the
advancement of technology occurs at a rate
that leaves the legal system in a constant
state of trying to catch up. According to
him, the courts depend on precedent “set in
wholly different contexts” that are “reliant
on a digital forensics field still in its infancy.”
[53] While it is essential to review examples
of precedent set in previous cases, we should
also keep in mind that, as Atkinson argues,
c 2020 JDFSL
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these precedents may have been set in a legal
context that is no longer relevant.
Although the literature on the prevalence
and impact of digital evidence in courts is
some-what limited, the bodies of literature
discussing Search and Seizure, Admissibility,
and Precedent does provide a context for the
research this paper undertakes. The existing
literature forms the foundation on which the
research questions of this study were built —
allowing the researcher to ask questions of
the prevalence and impact of digital evidence
in courts.

3.

METHEDOLOGY
3.1

Scope

The following analysis is based on a review
of relevant criminal cases in the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal from 2010 through 2015.
The United States circuit courts of appeal
were an ideal sample for this study for two
principal reasons. First, the 11 circuit courts
of appeal and the associated 94 United States
district courts cover the nation. There is at
least one court in each state and the District
of Columbia. Second, the 11 courts of appeals and the 94 district courts adhere to the
same rules of evidence – the Federal Rules
of Evidence. This is important when trying
to compare across or between the 11 circuit
courts of appeal.

3.2

Research Questions and
Objectives

A retrospective study was used to answer the
following research questions:
• What is the most common legal basis
for appeals relating to the introduction
or exclusion of digital evidence?
• How often are cases involving an appeal
regarding digital evidence affirmed or
reversed for the defense?
Page 9
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• What were the most frequently occurring legal grounds for reversed judgments
for the defense when digital evidence is
involved?
• What was the most frequently occurring
legal ground for affirmed judgments for
the defense when digital evidence is involved?
• Are some of the challenges to computer forensics and digital evidence more
prevalent than others? If so, why?
• Based on the results of this study, are
there trends or areas of the law as applied to computer forensics and digital
evidence that need further attention?

3.3

Data and Search Terms
Used

Data for this project was drawn from cases
that were affirmed or reversed by the United
States Courts of Appeal for the period 20102015. Cases were identified via LexisNexis,
using the following search terms: Computer,
Computer Forensics, Chat Log, Electronic
Evidence, Cell Phone, Sexting, iPhone, Child
Pornography, Digital Evidence, Computer
Investigation, GPS, and Encryption. Data
was compiled in a Microsoft Access database
and analyzed using Microsoft Excel. [54]

3.4

Cases Excluded

While searching for cases, three categories
of appeals became apparent: Search and
Seizure, Evidence Presented at Trial, and
Other Issues. The digital forensic process
has three major components: Seizure, Acquisition and Analysis, and Reporting. From
Figure 1, we can see that the three components of the digital forensic process line up
quite well with the first two categories for
bases of appeal: Search and Seizure and Evidence Presented at Trial. It is also apparent
Page 10

that the Other Issues category basis of appeals (i.e., Double Jeopardy, Prosecutorial
Misconduct, Sentencing, etc.) have little to
do with either the way the evidence was obtained, or how it was presented in court. For
these reasons, appeals that were based on
“other” issues were excluded from the results
and analysis for this study.

4.

RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION

The search parameters mentioned above identified 145 appeals involving legal issues related to digital evidence heard by the United States Courts of Appeal for the period
2010-2015.
All of these appeals followed convictions
for federal criminal offenses (see table 6 in
appendices for types of criminal offenses prosecuted). The types of technology where evidence was discovered included desktop computers, laptops, GPS tracking units, mobile
devices, and external storage devices. Of
the 145 appeals included in this study, 138
appeals (95.17 percent) were either affirmed
or reversed for the government. Seven appeals (4.83 percent) were either affirmed or
re-versed for the defense. [55]
In a 2010 article in Judge’s Journal, Clancy
points out that nearly “70 percent of all
re-ported appellate decisions involving the
search or seizure of digital evidence are concerned with the recovery of child pornography.” [56] In line with this finding, 89 percent
of appellate decisions in this study were related to the search and seizure of digital evidence related to the recovery of child pornography.
Sufficiency of Evidence was the most frequently occurring legal issue encountered as
a basis for appeal at 31.03 percent, followed
by Probable Cause at 27.59 percent; Defective Warrants at 12.24 percent; and Defective
Warrants at 12.41 percent. Other legal issues
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Figure 1. Digital Forensic Process Compared to Bases for Appeal
less frequently encountered included Scope
of the Warrant, Probative Value, Expectation of Privacy, Scientific Merit, Exclusionary
Rule, Relevancy, Authenticity, and Hearsay.
A complete list of legal issues can be found
in Table 2 of Appendix II.

4.1

Legal Issues

The United States District Court Systems adheres to the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE),
first adopted in 1975. [57] The rules regarding the introduction of digital evidence are
similar to that of any other evidence produced at trial. The legal issues encountered
within the 145 cases in this study were categorized as Search and Seizure, and Evidence
Presented at Trial. Pertinent FRE Rules or
precedent rulings, along with exemplar cases,
are provided in the following sections that
detail the legal issue argued on appeal, the
reasoning of the court, and the outcome of
the appeal.
c 2020 JDFSL

4.1.1

Search and Seizure

Probable Cause Digital evidence produced at trial must have been obtained with
a valid search warrant based on probable
cause to search for evidence of a crime or
criminal activity. The Fourth Amendment
limits the ability of law enforcement agents to
search for evidence. If probable cause cannot
be demonstrated, then evidence will likely
be suppressed under the Exclusionary Rule.
This legal principle was first established by
the United States Supreme Court in 1914 [58]
when the court held that “evidence obtained
by unconstitutional means cannot be used
against a defendant.” [59] Although val-id
warrants have always been generally required
by the courts, there are exceptions that allow
law enforcement to engage in warrant-less
searches. The exceptions include: Detention
Short of Arrest: Stop-and-Frisk [60]; Search
Incident to Arrest [61]; Vehicular Searches
[62]; Vessel Searches; Consent Searches; Border Searches; “Open Fields” [63]; Plain View
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[64]; Public Schools [65]; Prisons and Regulation of Probation [66]; and Drug Testing.
[67]
In United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040
(9th Cir. Wash. 2013), the district court
for the Western District of Washington appealed a district court ruling on the suppression of evidence gained from a search of the
defend-ant’s home. In ruling to suppress the
evidence, the district court held that “the
affidavit failed to connect generalized statements about child pornography collectors to
Schesso, thus rendering the warrant facially
deficient and the good faith exception inapplicable.” [68]
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision determining that “because there was a fair probability that evidence of child pornography would be found
on the defend-ant’s computer system, the underlying facts supported a finding of probable
cause; that the warrant was not overbroad
and did not raise the risks inherent in overseizing that this court considered in United
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.,
621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).” [69]
Defective Warrant Defective Warrant
appeals tend to center on the notion of the
staleness of the warrant. In general, “stale
information cannot be used in a probable
cause determination.” [70] Yet, whether information in a warrant is stale is dependent in
part by the inherent nature of the crime. For
example, child pornography “is not a fleeting
crime" and "is generally carried out in the
secrecy of the home and over a long period.”
[71] The staleness of a warrant is difficult
to prove with regard to child pornography
because the pornography is stored on computers, may readily be duplicated, retained indefinitely, and may well be recovered by forensic
software long after it has been deleted. [72]
In United States v. Hampton, 504 F. App.
402 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2012), Jack Eugene
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Hamp-ton appealed his conviction on charges
of receipt of child pornography in violation of
18 U.S.C.S. § 2252(a)(2), and possession of
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B). In his appeal, Hampton argued that the affidavit used to obtain to
search his residence was “stale because the
warrant was executed more than ten months
after German law enforcement officers observed child pornography shared through his
IP address.” [73]
The panel for the Sixth Circuit found that
given “the nature of child pornography and
our prior decisions upholding search warrants
despite similar delays, the ten-month delay
in obtaining a search warrant for Hampton’s
residence did not cause the information to
be-come stale by the time that [United States
Department of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent] Oberholtzer
requested the search warrant.” [74] Hampton’s convictions and sentence were affirmed.
Warrantless Seizure The Supreme Court
has consistently held that warrantless seizures
are per se unreasonable, with only a few
specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions. [75] One of those exceptions is
exigent circumstances, which require two conditions: “an objectively reasonable basis for
concluding that the loss or destruction of evidence is imminent; and that governmental
interest being served by the intrusion has
been weighed against the individual interest
that would be protected if a warrant were
required.” [76]
In United States v. Bradley, 488 F. App.
99 (6th Cir. July 12, 2012), Eric J. Bradley
was convicted and sentenced for receiving visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252(a)(2). In his appeal, Bradley contended
“that [Fayette County, Kentucky Investigator]
Bell had seized his computer without obtaining a search warrant and without Bradley’s
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consent and that no exception to the warrant
requirement applied.” [77]
In considering whether the destruction of
evidence was imminent in Bradley’s case, the
panel from the Sixth Circuit stated that “it is
objectively reasonable to seize a container an
officer has probable cause to believe contains
evidence of a crime, rather than leave it unguarded in the hands of a suspect who knows
that it will be searched.” [78] The panel also
considered the balance of interests at stake,
stating that “the government’s interest in deterring the production and dissemination of
child pornography is significant.” [79] In ruling that exigent circumstances existed and
that the execution of the warrantless seizure
was reasonable, the panel affirmed Bradley’s
conviction and sentence.
Scope of Warrant Under the Fourth
Amendment, search war-rants are required
to describe with particularity to prevent the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another, hence providing the scope of the
warrant. Appeals based on the scope of the
warrant incorporate two is-sues with regard
to particularity: whether the warrant supplies adequate information to guide officers
in selecting what items to seize, and whether
the category of items specified in the warrant
is too broad because it includes articles that
should not be seized. [80] The requirement
for particularity ensures that searches “will
not take the character of the wide-ranging
exploratory searches the Framers intended to
prohibit.” [81]
In United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645
(6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012), Ovell Evers, Sr.
challenged his conviction and sentence for
production of child pornography, in violation
of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2251(a); possession of child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252(a)(4)(B); and a forfeiture count under
18 U.S.C.S. § 2253. In his appeal, Evers
contended that “although the search warrant
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authorized the seizure of his computers, camera, and other electronic media, it did not
authorize a search of the black computer’s
hard drive, and the police therefore unlawfully exceeded the scope of the warrant when
they searched the contents of the computer
with-out obtaining a second warrant.” [82] In
rendering their decision in this appeal, the
panel of judges from the Sixth Circuit noted
that although the search warrant used to execute the search of Evers’ home was not a
model of precision, “it cross-referenced [the
investigating officer’s] affidavit, which in turn
recited the underlying factual circumstances
of the alleged sexual crimes, identified the
victim, gave the address of Evers’ residence,
and listed a "Digital Camera, Photo’s [sic],
Personal Computer and accessories" — items
linked by [the victim] to the offenses — as objects subject to seizure.” [83] In this instance,
the court affirmed both the conviction and
sentence for Evers.
Expectation of Privacy The expectation
of privacy is derived from Katz v. United
States, 389 S. Ct. 347 (Dec. 18, 1967). This
Supreme Court ruling deter-mined that intrusion with technology could be classified
as a search, and as such could also result
in an unreasonable search and seizure if the
defendant exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as "reasonable." [84]
In United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d
825 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014), Guy Edward
Whee-lock appealed his conviction and sentence for receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252(a). In this case,
Wheelock was arrested after law enforcement
used in-formation gleaned from an administrative subpoena to match the defendant to a
computer that downloaded child pornography
us-ing peer-to-peer software. In his appeal,
Wheelock contended that an administrative
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subpoena “violated his Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in the subscriber information
obtained from Comcast.” [85] [86]
In deciding his appeal, the panel from the
Eighth Circuit determined that the investigating officer requested retrievable information
from Comcast, and demonstrated that “that
the requested records [were] relevant to an
ongoing, legitimate law enforcement investigation of Distribution of Child Pornography.”
[87] Recognizing that this was all that the current statute required, the court concluded by
saying that “federal courts in a federal prosecution do not suppress evidence that is seized
by state officers in violation of state law, so
long as the search complied with the Fourth
Amendment.” [88] Based on their decision,
the court affirmed Wheelock’s conviction and
sentence.
4.1.2

Evidence Presented at Trial

Sufficiency of Evidence In United States
v. Dixon, 589 F. App. 427 (11th Cir. Oct. 23,
2014), Travis “Rocky” Dixon was convicted of
receiving child pornography and possession
of child pornography, both in violation of
18 U.S.C.S. § 2252(a) (4) (B). Following his
conviction, Dixon contended that the government produced insufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty
of downloading the child pornography found
on a computer in his bedroom.
In reviewing his appeal, the panel for the
Eleventh Circuit found that “Dixon’s admission that he searched for and downloaded
child pornography together with the corroborating evidence of downloaded child pornography found on his computer constituted sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude
that Dixon knowingly received and possessed
child pornography.” [89] Dixon’s conviction
and sentence, in this case, were affirmed. In
United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911 (9th
Cir. Feb. 8, 2011), Andrew Flyer appealed
his conviction “in the U.S. District Court for
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the District of Arizona under 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252 of attempted transportation and shipping of child pornography, possession of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252(a)(4)(B).” [90]
In his appeal, Flyer argued that “there was
insufficient evidence to establish that he exercised dominion and control over the images
recovered from the unallocated space on the
hard drive. Alternatively, he argues that even
if he could be said to have "possessed" the
images before their deletion, no evidence indicated that the possession occurred during
the time period charged in the indictment.”
[91]
During its review, the panel from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the government conceded that no evidence was presented that Flyer knew of the presence of the
contraband images in the unallocated space
on his computer. They also conceded that
Flyer did not have the forensic software necessary to view the files in unallocated space.
Further, there was no evidence that Flyer ever
manipulated the images, and Flyer never admitted to viewing the charged images. The
government countered that evidence demonstrating that the charged files were at some
point deleted were sufficient to establish possession. The panel from the Ninth Circuit
disagreed.
In their opinion, the panel noted that
“deletion of an image alone does not support a conviction for knowing possession of
child pornography on or about a certain date
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A.
No evidence indicated that on or about April
13, 2004, Flyer could recover or view any of
the charged images in unallocated space or
that he even knew of their presence there.”
[92] Consequently, Flyer’s conviction for possession of child pornography was reversed.
The convictions for attempted shipping of
child pornography and possession of child
pornography on CDs were affirmed.
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Relevancy Digital evidence must be relevant. According to FRE Rule 401, Test for
Relevant Evidence, the evidence is relevant if
“it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” [93] However, relevant evidence may be excluded under Rule
403, Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time or Other
Reasons, if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more
of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” [94]
In United States v. Reynolds, 626 F. App.
610 (6th Cir, 2015), Donald Reynolds appealed his conviction and sentencing for receipt and distribution of child pornography
in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(a)(2); and
one count of possession of child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
Reynolds argued that expert witness testimony based on historical cell-site data lacked
relevancy and that the district court erred in
admitting this evidence.
During a search of his residence on April
7, 2011, agents from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) discovered over 8,000 images of child pornography on a laptop owned
by Reynolds. Reynolds disputed that he had
downloaded the images, stating that as many
as three other persons living in the house
had access to his laptop, including his two
adult children. The FBI introduced historical cell-site tracking analysis at trial to assist
in their determination of who was not at
home during the relevant download periods
in their investigation. This information also
did not show that Reynolds was absent from
the home during the same relevant download
periods.
The court determined that the historical
cell phone records were relevant because “it
c 2020 JDFSL

JDFSL V14N4

was probative as to whether each of four persons who generally had access to a desktop
computer was absent from the computer’s
location while child pornography was downloaded onto that computer.” [95] According
to the court, the evidence also showed “that
Reynolds’s absence from the residence could
not be demonstrated, permitting an inference that Reynolds was the only one out of
four house-hold members who was at the residence during the time child pornography was
down-loaded onto a desktop computer in that
residence.” [96] His conviction and sentence
were thusly affirmed by the panel from the
Sixth Circuit.
Probative Value In United States v. Ballard, 448 F. App. 987 (11th Cir. Dec. 15,
2011), Kenneth Allen Ballard appealed his
conviction for distribution and receipt of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252A(a)(2). Ballard argued that the district
court for the Middle District of Alabama had
abused its discretion “by allowing into evidence every image and a portion of the videos
of child pornography that were charged in
the indictment, despite Ballard’s stipulation
that the 15 pictures and three videos were
child pornography.” [97] Ballard contended
that the images unfairly prejudiced the jury
and that the impact of the images off-set
its probative value and should have been excluded under Rule 403, Excluding Relevant
Evidence.
In considering Ballard’s appeal, the court
noted that FRE Rule 403 is an "extraordinary
remedy which the district court should invoke
sparingly and that the balance should be
struck in favor of admissibility.” [98] In its
decision affirming the District Court’s ruling,
the panel from the Seventh Circuit found
that the “relevant evidence of the images and
videos was not extrinsic to the crime, but was
part of the actual pornography possessed.”
[99]
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Authenticity Digital evidence must be authentic. FRE Rule 901, Authenticating or
Identifying Evidence states that to "satisfy
the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent
must produce evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is." [100]
To demonstrate the authenticity of digital data being presented as evidence, such
as a hard drive from a computer or mobile
device, the court must be shown that it “was
acquired from a specific computer and/or location, that a complete and accurate copy of
digital evidence was acquired, and that it has
remained unchanged since it was collected.”
[101] In practice, this process is called making a forensic image or mirror image, and
is well-understood by the courts. “Making
a mirror image of the hard drive is central
to the examination process and is a routine,
technical step taken by well-trained. . . agents.
It is done to maintain the integrity and security of the original evidence. A mirror image
is an exact duplicate of the entire hard drive
and includes all the scattered clusters of the
active and deleted files and slack and free
space. Having such a mirror image of the
hard drive also allows the examiner to reconstruct the steps of the examination at a later
time.” [102]
A hash value is used to authenticate an
individual file within the mirror image of a
hard drive, or the forensic image file itself.
[103] A hash value is a “unique numerical
identifier that can be assigned to a file, a
group of files, or a portion of a file, based on
a standard mathematical algorithm applied
to the characteristics of the data set . . .
‘Hashing’ is used to guarantee the authenticity of an original data set and can be used as
a digital equivalent of the Bates stamp used
in paper document production.” [104]
Case law has further clarified the issue of
authenticity. In United States v. Siddiqui,
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235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000), the
court stated that a “district court has the discretion to determine authenticity, and that
determination should not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that there is no competent evidence in the record to support it.”
In United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293
(11th Cir. May 4, 2011), the court stated that
"evidence may be authenticated through the
testimony of a witness with knowledge." [106]
Potential evidence is also subject to the
FRE Rules 1002 and 1003 for Best Evidence. Rule 1002, Requirement of the Original, states that “[a]n original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to
prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.” [107]
With regard to digital evidence, this is best
understood in terms of the digital image of
the original evidence that is made for analysis purposes. The original is not available,
be-cause using it might destroy or alter the
original evidence. Rule 1003, Admissibility
of Duplicates, allows this type of evidence
to be admissible. The rule states that “a
duplicate is admissible to the same extent
as the original unless a genuine question is
raised about the original’s authenticity or the
circumstances make it unfair to admit the
duplicate.” [108]
In United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d
1000 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2012), Adam
Lebowitz appealed his convictions for producing child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C.S. § 2251(a), and of attempting to entice a child to engage in unlawful sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2422(b).
At trial, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia admitted
into evidence printed transcripts of chat messages between Lebowitz and a minor whom
he was attempting to engage in illegal sexual activity. In his appeal, Lebowitz argued
that “admission of the printouts violated the
authentication requirement in Federal Rule
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of Evidence 901.” [109] The minor who produced the printout of the chat sessions in
question testified at trial that these printouts
accurately represent-ed the conversations he
had with Lebowitz, though he could not recall when he had produced the printouts.
In forming its opinion, in this case, the
panel relied on previous decisions made by
the Eleventh Circuit in finding that “appellate
courts reviewing a cold record give particular
deference to credibility determinations of a
fact-finder who had the opportunity to see
live testimony.” [110] In so doing, the panel
determined that the district court did not err
in admitting the chat session printouts into
evidence. The conviction and sentence for
Lebowitz were therefore affirmed.
Hearsay Under FRE Rule 801, hearsay is
an out-of-court statement introduced for the
truth of the matter asserted; it applies if the
proponent plans to use the record’s contents
as substantive evidence. [111] Hearsay generally may not be admitted as evidence. With
regard to digital evidence, the rules regarding Hearsay apply in two ways: email, text
messages, and computer-generated reports
are considered written statements, while digital video or audio recordings are considered
spoken statements. Regardless, there are
specific documents (in written or electronic
form) that are considered factual, including
computer-generated reports, business records,
family records, and public records.
In United States v. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789
F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. June 18, 2015), the question before the Ninth Circuit was whether
a Google Earth satellite image and a digital
tack labeled with GPS coordinates should be
considered hearsay.
On January 17, 2003, while near the Mexican border, Paciano Lizarraga-Tirado was
arrest-ed as a previously removed alien and
charged with illegal re-entry into the United
States under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1326. At trial, the
c 2020 JDFSL

JDFSL V14N4

defend-ant claimed that he was still on the
Mexican side of the border prior to his arrest,
awaiting instructions from a smuggler.
The federal agents that arrested LizarragaTirado testified to their familiarity with the
border area where they made the arrest and
were sure that they arrested him north of the
border. The agents recorded the GPS coordinates of the arrest on a hand-held device. A
Google Earth satellite image with the GPS coordinates marked was introduced as evidence
at trial. By default, Google Earth marks certain areas on an image, such as nearby towns,
and bodies of water. The program also offers users two ways to add markers of their
own to the maps it produces. First, a user
can manually add a tack, or digital marker,
to a map, which the user can label. Users
can also type GPS coordinates into Google
Earth, which then automatically creates a
tack at the proper place on the map. Significantly, the map introduced as evidence
had the second type of markers produced by
Google Earth.
In considering whether the Google Earth
image was hearsay, the panel “held that a
photograph isn’t hearsay because it makes
no assertion. Rather, a photograph merely
depicts a scene as it existed at a particular time.” [112] They determined that the
Google Earth program had accurately placed
the tack. In their deliberations, the panel produced an ex-act replica of the map introduced
at trial, with the GPS coordinates marked
exactly as they were in evidence. Further,
the user of the program has no role in determining where the marker will be placed on
the map because the Google Earth program
does that work.
The panel stated that “[b]ecause the program makes the relevant assertion — that
the tack is accurately placed at the labeled
GPS coordinates — there is no statement
as defined by the hearsay rule. In reaching
that conclusion, we join other Circuits that
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have held that ma-chine statements are not
hearsay.” The defendant’s conviction was subsequently affirmed.
Scientific Merit Since digital evidence
produced by computer forensics is considered scientific, it must also meet the Daubert
Standard. The standard stems from Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 595 (1993), and has five factors
for judges to determine whether scientific evidence is admissible in court: testing, peer
review, error rate, standards, and acceptance.
The Daubert Standard is also applied to expert witnesses in federal criminal trials. Under FRE Rule 702, Opinions and Expert Testimony, the court must determine (a) the
ex-pert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied
the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.” [115]
In United States v. Stanley, 533 F. App.
325 (4th Cir. July 19, 2013), Paul Stanley appealed his conviction for receipt, transportation, and possession of child pornography
in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(a)(1),
18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(2), and 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), arguing that the district
court erred in admitting expert testimony
from an agent who conducted the forensic
examination of Stanley’s laptop computer.
Stanley argued specifically that Agent Crystal Gilmer of the Maryland State Police “possessed in-sufficient specialized knowledge or
skill in the software programs used to extract
data from Stanley’s computer, and failed to
offer testimony regarding the reliability of
the forensic tools used in the examination.”
[116]
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In examining the pertinent facts, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that agent Gilmer was part of a lengthy voir
dire that established her “education, training,
experience, and knowledge of the forensic
tools and procedures she utilized, as well
as detailed explanations of her use of the
forensic software in this particular case.” [117]
During this proceeding, Agent Gilmer also
explained that the tools used to examine the
defendant’s laptop were accepted as a reliable
practice by the Maryland State Police.
In denying Stanley’s appeal, the court
found that the record strongly supported the
determination by the district court of Agent
Gil-more’s competence as an expert and the
reliability of her findings.

4.2

Revisiting the Research
Questions

• What was the most common legal basis
for appeals of computer forensics evidence? For Search and Seizure related
appeals, Probable Cause was the most
common basis of an appeal. For Evidence Presented at Trial, the most frequently occurring basis of the appeal was
Sufficiency of Evidence.
• How often were cases involving an appeal
regarding computer forensics affirmed or
reversed for the defense? Of the cases
included in this study, twelve appeals
(8.16 percent) were affirmed or reversed
for the defense.
• What were the most frequently occurring legal grounds for reversed judgments
for the defense? Out of the 10 reversals
for the defense, five were based on Sufficiency of Evidence.
• What was the most frequently occur-ring
legal ground for affirmed judgments for
the defense? There were two instances of
affirmed judgments for the defense: one
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based on a defective warrant and the
other based on the scope of the warrant.
• Are some challenges to digital evidence
more prevalent than others? If so, why?
The majority of challenges seen in this
study were based on Search and Seizure
issues, rather than the science of computer forensics. The “why” part of the
question is more difficult to discern. This
study only examined appeals from criminal cases heard by the U.S. Courts of
Appeal. Future re-search may involve
an in-depth look at cases at the federal
district court level to examine this issue.
• Based on the results of this study, are
there trends or areas of the law as applied to computer forensics that needs
further attention? One area of concern
is particularity in regard to the scope
of search war-rants. Particularity governs how far the government can search
based on a particular factual predicate.
Several important cases with regard to
particularity have been decided by the
courts recently (Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 2473 (2014), and United States
v. Ganias, 725 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014).
This issue will continue to be central
to appeals based on Search and Seizure
in general, and those involving digital
evidence specifically.

5.

LIMITATIONS

The overall goal for the current study was to
examine the legal basis for appeals related
to digital evidence and the subsequent U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeal rulings on such appeals. This study surveyed appeals from federal criminal cases heard before the United
States Courts of Appeal from 2010 to 2015.
Subsequently, new technologies have become
part of the fabric of life, such as storing inc 2020 JDFSL
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formation in the cloud, or the Internet of
Things.
Future research should consider how these
newer technologies have affected the legal
landscape. For example, future research
should investigate the impact of Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) on
appeals related to probable cause, or the expectation of privacy. Researchers may want
to consider civil matters before the court with
regard to digital evidence.
Additionally, the methodology for the current study included analyzing cases from
Lexus Nexus. As such, the potential bias
of the jurists was outside the scope of the
current study. Future researchers may also
want to consider any potential bias in the
decision making process used by jurists in
rendering their opinions.

6.

CONCLUSIONS

Of the 145 cases included in this study, only
22 appeals were based on the science of computer forensics, including probative value, authenticity, hearsay, relevancy, and scientific
merit. In each of those cases, previous rulings
were affirmed. This raises several questions
to contemplate:
Overall, digital evidence does not seem
to play a large role in federal criminal appeals filed within the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
While the search terms used in this study may
have missed some of the cases that would otherwise have been included, the fact that only
147 of the 45,030 federal, criminal cases affirmed or reversed for the years 2010 through
2015 raises questions.
• Does digital evidence tend to support
previously supported facts of a particular case (i.e., corroborative), or is it so
strong as to overbear any evidence to
the contrary (i.e., conclusive)?
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• What is the frequency with which digital evidence is being admitted in the
U.S. District Courts?
• What are the legal bases for those instances where computer forensics is suppressed as evidence?
• Is computer forensics underutilized as
evidence?
To answer these questions, it will be necessary to more closely examine the trial proceedings at the U.S. District Court level.

7.

NOTES

1. William J. Sabol, "Social Science
Research on Forensic Science: Dear
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